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n his 1999 paper, "Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of
Intention" Michael Bratman argues that two prevailing descriptions of the nature of intentions, Resolution and Sophistication, are inadequate. By way of a series of examples Bratman attempts to demonstrate that Resolution theory is
too restrictive, creating situations in which actors are not capable
of altering their choices based on a new evaluative ranking of
their options. Sophistication theory, according to Bratman, is
unable to explain our intuitions in cases in which the actor
should not change her intentions, despite a current evaluative
ranking to the contrary. In order to address these weaknesses,
Bratman introduces his No-Regret theory, which he believes resolves the problems faced by Resolution and Sophistication. In
this paper I will reconstruct Bratman's arguments, demonstrating
how he believes that the No-Regret theory improves upon the
other two views. I will then demonstrate a crucial error in Bratman's reasoning, to wit: in his development of No-Regret theory
he ceases to address intentions, according to most accepted definitions of the term. Finally I will introduce a means of classifying intentions—call it Intention Indefeasibility. Appeals to this
definition of intention will jibe with the more traditional conceptions of intention, and will, by comparison, demonstrate the flaw
in Bratman's argument.
Bratman’s article investigates rational agency. That is, he
aims to discover what would be rational for a planning agent to
do in a given situation. Planning agents “settle in advance on
prior, partial plans for future action, fill them in as time goes by,
and execute them when the time comes.”1 In his attempt to formulate a theory to explain rational planning, Bratman recognizes
an inherent tension. That is, while planning agents formulate
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their plans in advance, they remain temporal agents, retaining
control over what they do at the moment. Any theory must accommodate the agent’s ability to alter her plans, but at the same
time retain the importance of past plans in current decisions.
Bratman stresses the importance of plan stability:
22

By settling now what she will do later a planning
agent puts herself in a position to plan appropriate preliminary steps and means…This will work
only if her plans are to some extent stable…not
constantly starting from scratch…A theory of instrumentally rational planning agency is in part a
theory of intention and plan stability: a theory of
when an instrumentally rational planning agent
should or should not reconsider and abandon a
prior intention.2
It is this aspect of the theory that most concerns this paper, i.e.
intention stability. When should a rational agent alter her intentions? It seems reasonable to grant that one’s intentions might
change due to the receipt of previously unforeseen information.
For example, one’s intention to see a new movie might be
changed by discovering that the movie theatre has closed. However, it is key for Bratman’s theory that it is possible for intentions to change, even without the intervention of unforeseen
events. This will be discussed at greater length later in the paper.
It is helpful here to discuss the two planning strategies
that Bratman is criticizing: Sophistication and Resolution. A Sophisticated agent, “Adjusts her prior plans to insure that what
she plans to do will be, at the time of action, favored by her thenpresent evaluative rankings.”3 The Sophisticated planner operates based on the conjunction of the linking principle with the
standard view:
Linking Principle: States that if a rational agent has formed a
plan (at time t1) to perform action A at a later time (t2) given a
series of events, and those events transpire, then the agent
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should not suppose at time t1 that at t2 they will not A
Standard View: Instrumental rationality depends on the agent’s
evaluative rankings at the time of the action.
The alternate strategy, Resolution, operates based on the linking
principle alone, ignoring the standard view all together. Essentially Resolution states that, “If it was best in prospect to settle on
a prior plan, and if there is no unanticipated information or
change in basic values, then it is rational to follow through with
the plan.”4
Bratman is seeking to demonstrate the inability of these
two prevailing planning strategies to properly handle instrumentally rational planning agency. In doing this, Bratman introduces
a class of examples that he believes will exceed the bounds of any
existing planning strategy:
In all… cases there is a prior plan or policy settling on which is best in prospect. And in [these]
cases the agent knows that when the occasion for
action arrives her rankings of then-present options
will argue against following through.5
As stated in the above quote, in each example an agent will form
a plan of action, and without any unforeseen events taking place,
find themselves in a position in which their current evaluative
rankings favor some different action. Bratman holds that a
proper strategy model should return results in keeping with our
intuitions, that is, in situations in which a rational agent should
alter their plans, the model should give that result. Conversely,
when the plans should be carried out, despite current rankings,
the model should give that result.
A class of cases in which a rational agent should change
their plans is identified by Bratman as cases of “Autonomous
Benefit”, in which the reward for an action is separated from the
action itself. Simply forming the intention to perform said action
brings about the benefit. It is in this section that Bratman’s
“Toxin Case” is introduced. A quick sketch of the case:
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A billionaire… offers to give me a lot of money on
Tuesday if I form an intention on Monday to
drink a disgusting but non-lethal toxin on
Wednesday. I would be more than willing to
drink the toxin to get the money. However, to get
the money I do not need to drink the toxin; I just
need to intend on Monday to drink it.6
Questions abound. What would an instrumentally rational planning agent do? Can one form an intention on Monday to drink
the toxin, knowing full well that on Wednesday one will have no
reason to, and indeed will not do so? Bratman maintains that an
ideally rational planning agent should, on Monday, form the intention to drink the toxin. For on Monday, the benefits from intending to drink the toxin outweigh the costs. However, that
same rational agent, after the money has been exchanged, would
then decide not to drink the toxin since there would no longer be
any reason to. Bratman feels that a proper theory should return
this result.
The Sophisticated planner would be unable to form the
intention in the first place. Because they subscribe to both the
linking principle and the standard view, and since in this example there can be no unforeseen events, the agent would be incapable of intending to do something that would contradict her
predictable evaluative ranking at the time of action. Hence, the
Sophisticated planner, being unable to formulate the intention to
drink the toxin would not obtain the autonomous benefit.
The planner using the Resolution method will, on Monday, be able to form the intention to drink the toxin, but Resolution requires that, on Wednesday the agent go through with their
plan and drink the toxin. This is true regardless of the fact that
there is now no benefit brought about by drinking the toxin.
Bratman holds that, while this is still and improvement over Sophistication, there remains significant problems associated with
Resolution’s handling of the Toxin case:
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[Resolution], in seeking a strong role for planning
in achieving the benefits of coordination over time
and across agents, seems not to do justice to the
basic fact that as agents we are temporally and
causally located.7
So, in cases of Autonomous Benefits, the Resolution method allows the benefit to be achieved but does not seem to comport
with our understanding of the temporal element of agency; i.e.
that an agent should be capable of altering plans which are in no
way beneficial (following through with the intention to drink the
toxin) regardless of past preference.
The second class of cases introduced by Bratman is
known as “Temporary Reversal in Rankings”, or Temptation examples. In these cases the agent will form a plan at time t1, then
without any unforeseen information, at t2 the evaluative rankings of the agent will change. However, the change in rankings
is only temporary and the former rankings will return at a time
in the future t3. Ann’s case is representative of this class:
Ann enjoys a good read after dinner but also loves
fine beer at dinner. However, she knows that if
she has more than one beer at dinner she cannot
concentrate on her book after dinner. Prior to dinner Ann prefers an evening of one beer plus a
good book to an evening with more than one beer
but no book… [However] each evening at dinner,
having drunk her first [beer]…she prefers a second beer to her after dinner read… As she knows
all along this change in ranking will be shortlived: after dinner she will return to her preference for a good read.8
How would our two conventional strategies handle
Ann’s case? Sophistication suggests that, because at dinner Ann
always prefers a second beer, she could never have settled on the
one-beer plan in the first place (remember, sophistication re-
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quires the agent to adhere to both the linking principle and the
standard view). Resolution however, allows that Ann could very
well form the intention to drink only one beer at dinner. Ann
would then be required, (due to the linking principle) of carrying
out her intention in the event of no unforeseen information. In
this case Ann is aware of all relevant information at the time of
her plan formation, and as such she should drink only one beer
in accordance with her original plan. Bratman holds that this is
the desired outcome for a rational agent, to be able to form plans,
aware of the fact that at some point in the future the ranking of
the options would switch, and still carry out one’s original plan.
The contrasting results in the Toxin case and Ann’s case
trouble Bratman. In each of the situations, it seems that Resolution is better able to explain the situation than Sophistication,
enabling the receiving of the autonomous reward and requiring
Ann to drink only one beer. However, Bratman holds that the
Toxin case demonstrates the true weakness of Resolution, its failure to account for the temporal status of the agent. It seems that
a truly rational agent, having received the reward, would not
drink the toxin; there would simply be no benefit to be had.
Why is this the case? Why in the Toxin case do we expect a rational agent not to follow through with her intentions, but in
Ann’s case we do? Resolution and Sophistication are incapable
of returning results in keeping with our intuitions as to the behavior of a rational agent. A new rational planning strategy is
required.
It is in this pursuit that Bratman introduces the No-Regret
planning condition that he feels, “avoid[s] both extremes
[Resolution and Sophistication].”9 The No-Regret condition
deals with the agent’s decision at the time of the action, on
Wednesday for the Toxin case and during dinner for Ann. Bratman carefully dissects the argument for action based on future
regret:
One should act in accord with prior intention in
the event that:
Upon sticking with your prior intention, you will
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be glad you did.
Upon failing to stick with your prior intention,
you will wish you had.
So, other things being equal,
Though you now prefer to abandon your prior
intention, you should nevertheless stick with
it.10
In this way the subject retains the ability to act as a temporal
causal agent. At the time of action the agent anticipates the consequences of her following through with previously held plans.
If she decides that at an “appropriate later time” following
through with her intentions would lead to regret, then she abandons her plan.11 On the other hand, if she decides that acting in
accord with her previous plan would not bring about regret, she
acts consistent with her plan. How does this divide up the cases
with which we were dealing? In the Toxin case the No-Regret
condition stipulates that we deal with the agent’s decision at the
time of action, on Wednesday. Just before drinking the toxin the
subject must consider her future regret (i.e. Will she regret not
drinking the toxin?) It seems that the answer is obviously no. In
fact it is much more likely that a rational agent, faced with the
choice of drinking a revolting concoction with no possibility of
benefit, would certainly regret drinking said mixture. This
seems the proper response, allowing the agent to make a decision based on their current temporal state.
This leaves us with Ann’s case. Evaluating Ann’s situation based on the No-Regret principle requires us to evaluate her
decisions during dinner, at a point when she genuinely prefers a
second beer to reading her book. Here again we are given the
desired response. Ann, understanding that her preference of a
second beer over “a good read” is temporary, would, at some
future point, regret having consumed the second beer. She will
regret having abandoned her single-beer policy.
This seems a victory for Bratman and his No-Regret condition. In both situations of Autonomous Benefits and Temptation we are given the response understood to be that of a rational
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agent. In this way we avoid the difficulties of both Sophistication and Resolution and in the process, “arrive at a view of instrumentally rational planning agency that does justice both to
the fact that we are planners and to the fact that we are temporarily and causally located agents.”12
Bratman’s investigation into instrumentally rational planning agency is well thought out in its handling of rational planning. It seems that Bratman’s No-Regret model does provide
results that correspond to our intuitions. Neither the Resolution
nor Sophistication models were able to give the correct responses
in both of the above situations. In this way Bratman’s No-Regret
model is a success. However, I hold that his criticism of both
theories (which provided the impetus for positing the No-Regret
theory) rested on an interpretation of intention that is in conflict
with all prevailing definitions offered by psychologists and philosophers engaged in the study of intention. Here I will attempt
to give a brief definition of intentions as they are commonly
thought of. As the definition becomes more explicit, it will become ever clearer that Bratman’s concept of intention is at odds
with the field’s view in general.
An intention is typically thought of as a pro-attitude (its
content is the desired alteration of the external world) and consists of a desire and a belief. While desires themselves are also
pro-attitudes, there are several distinctions. Because intentions
are the conjunction of a desire and a belief, they unlike desires,
must be consistent with our set of beliefs.13 Agent S could safely
say that she desires to jump over the Empire State building in a
single bound. However, should S inform her friends that she
intends to perform the same task, she will be thought of as very
odd indeed. Louis J. Moses states that in order for S to intend to
A then S must believe at least one of the following:
I can-A
There is some chance that I will A
I probably will A
I will A14
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Moses feels that option (a) is likely too weak, and option (d) is
likely too strong. He concludes that, “intending to A requires a
relatively strong belief that one will A.”15 In addition to consistency with beliefs, an intention carries a greater commitment to
action than a desire. When an agent is said to intend, they are
said to have “actually decid[ed] to perform the action in question,” this is not the case with desire.16 It seems that intentions
commit us to action in a way that desires do not. While we have
no strict consensus on a definition of intention (and a growing
segment of philosophers believe such a definition will never exist), there remains some general consensus; that is, an intention
must be consistent with one’s beliefs and it commits one (in some
degree) to action. As will be demonstrated in the remainder of
this paper, Bratman’s use of “intention” in no way meets the
above conditions.
In his cases of Autonomous Benefit, Bratman describes a
case in which an intention must be formed. However, when the
time comes to perform the action, that was the content of the
original intention, the agent may then decide whether to follow
through. This seems correct, at least it seems in keeping with our
experience of everyday rational planning. Bratman uses the example of preparing for a job interview with Jones, but upon arriving, Smith has taken her place. In this situation we must, as
temporally located agents, be understood to be capable of reconsidering and perhaps changing our plans. However, in the paper under examination, Bratman is not interested in these everyday vicissitudes, he is interested in cases in which, “one’s circumstances are, in all relevant aspects, those for which one has
specifically planned.”17 Here Bratman’s theory as to instrumentally rational planning faces a problem. In the Toxin case, the
agent must be aware of “all relevant aspects”, and it seems that
this must include the agent’s foreseeable disposition not to drink
on Wednesday. The agent is aware that as of Wednesday the
money will have already been distributed, or not, and will understand that there will then be no incentive to actually drink the
toxin. This is certainly a relevant aspect of the case, and the
agent (being ideally rational) must know that on Wednesday she

30

Joseph Alberts

will not drink the toxin. This puts the agent in the precarious
position of intending to do something he knows that he will not
do. This is absolutely in conflict with the accepted definitions of
intention given above. Bratman is in violation of the condition of
belief consistency. One cannot intend to do what one does not
believe one will do. In this case the agent, being aware of all
relevant aspects, does not believe that he will drink the toxin,
therefore, he cannot have intended to drink. What the above
definitions imply, and what Bratman fails to acknowledge, is that
intention, in the way it is understood in folk psychology and by
experts in the field, takes on an indefeasible quality.
Indefeasibility is a concept most commonly associated
with Epistemology. Briefly, in any theory of knowledge subscribing to an indefeasible standard, one is said to know a proposition P if and only if there is no undefeated defeater of your justification for knowing P. To clarify, in order for subject S to
know P, there can exist no evidence E that would undermine S’s
justification for knowing P. Such evidence is referred to as a
“defeater.” However, S can still be said to know P, if S can present evidence D which undermines E. In this case evidence D is
referred to as a “defeater-defeater”. If S is to know P there can be
no piece of evidence for which there is no “defeater-defeater”,
such irrefutable evidence is known as an “Undefeated Defeater.”18 This typically epistemological notion can also be understood as applying to intention. Just as knowledge is not granted
in the event of an undefeated defeater of justification, intention
status may be withheld due to the existence of an undefeated defeater of the agent’s belief. In the case of intentions, a defeater
can be understood as a piece of information that, if known,
would defeat the belief that one could or would perform the action. For example, S might intend to join the army. However,
person X might inform S that in order to join the Armed Forces,
one must be at least 5’5” tall, which S is not. Once understood by
S, this piece of evidence could be said to successfully defeats S’s
intention to join the Army. This is not necessarily an undefeated
defeater however, if S knows that X is a liar (or simply as poorly
informed as the author of this paper) and the actual height re-
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quirement is 5’0”, which S easily clears, then S could still be said
to intend to joint the army.19
We can now formulate a definition of intention as characterized by indefeasibility; we will call it Intention-Indefeasibility:
Subject S, at time t1, can be said to intend to A, at
time t2, if there exist no undefeated defeaters of
S’s intention to A
This can be understood as strong Intention-Indefeasibility, and it
does not seem to correspond to our intuitions as to intentions.
For example, in the above case, before it was explained to S that
he was too short to join the army, one would say that S intended
to join the army. It seems that S must be aware of the defeater of
his intention in order to be said not to intend. This leads to the
positing of weak Intention-Indefeasibility:
Subject S, at time t1, can be said to intend to A, at
time t2, if there exist no undefeated defeaters of
S’s intention to A of which S is aware.
This seems to correspond nicely with our understanding of intentions. In fact, it serves a similar function to the first of our
original conditions, that S’s intention be consistent with his beliefs.
When examining intentions as used by Bratman through
the lens of Intention-Indefeasibility it becomes clear that Bratman
has a substantial problem. In the case of the toxin, subject S, at
time t1 is being asked to form an intention to drink a toxin at t3.
However, as subject S is aware of all relevant aspects of the case,
S understands that at t3 she will already have acquired the
money (or not) at t2, and as such will have no reason to drink the
toxin. Being a rational agent, S will understand that at t3 S will
not drink the toxin. S’s knowledge that she will not drink is a
clear “undefeated-defeater” of her ability to form an intention to
drink. As S is clearly aware of her belief that she will not drink
the toxin, weak Intention-Indefeasibility tells us that at time t1, S
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cannot be said to intend to drink the toxin. In Bratman’s example, the billionaire possesses an intention detector and will discover this lack of intention; ergo, S will not receive the benefit.
Only by committing in a binding way (indicating that S truly believes that at t3 she will drink the toxin) will S receive the benefit.
If she were aware of all relevant information, she would have to
be committed to following through with her plan. Any deviation
from the plan could only be explained by unforeseen events,
which are explicitly ruled out of the equation. Bratman has a
problem.
On the other hand, Bratman’s examination of the Temptation case seems to pass the test of weak Intention-Indefeasibility.
There does not exist an undefeated-defeater, that Ann is aware
of, which will preclude her from forming her intention. Ann’s
temporary ranking of a second beer over a night with a book
might be considered a defeater of her intention. However, one
might posit that Ann’s understanding of her long-term evaluative ranking (reading over beer) might fill the role of defeaterdefeater. Weak Intention-Indefeasibility concludes that Ann can
intend to have only one beer and barring unforeseen information
(here an impossibility) will follow through with her original
plan.
Bratman’s investigation into instrumentally rational planning does elucidate the likely actions of a perfectly rational planning agent. In both the Autonomous Benefit and Temptation
cases, we would like to say that a rational agent would decline to
drink the toxin or the second beer. However, closer examination
has given us reason to doubt the applicability of Bratman’s NoRegret theory to his “Toxin Case”. Simply put, Bratman just isn’t
talking about intentions as we know them.
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19. Information that casts doubt upon the intention, but does not eliminate the possibility is less clear. For example, if S were to learn that the
only way to join the army was by way of lottery, and in that drawing he
would have a 50% chance of being accepted, would we still say he has
an intention to join the army? If so, would he retain his intention if he
stood a 10% chance of being admitted? It is possible that in such a
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However, this seems to imply that S would succeed in his intention regardless of the outcome of the drawing, a sentiment that would probably not be echoed by S upon failing to have his number drawn. These
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